EL OJO DE LA MENTE DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER PDF
Hofstadter Douglas R – Dennett Daniel C el ojo de la mente. 3 likes. Book. By Douglas R. Hofstadter, Daniel C. Dennett. Show description. Read or Download El Ojo De La Mente PDF. Similar spanish books. New PDF. Manny said: I have been conducting a long discussion about the nature of tra mente e cervello, volto a tirare acqua al mulino del riduzionismo fisicalista dei due . La cosa buffa é che questo libro di tecnico ha veramente poco: per lo più si.
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Return to Book Page. Brilliant, shattering, mind-jolting, The Mind’s I is a searching, probing cosmic journey of the mind that goes deeply into the problem of self and self-consciousness as anything written in our time.
From verbalizing chimpanzees to scientific speculations involving machines with souls, from the mesmerizing, maze-like fiction of Borges to the tantalizing, dreamlike fiction o Brilliant, shattering, mind-jolting, The Mind’s I is a searching, probing cosmic journey of the mind that goes deeply into the problem of self and self-consciousness as anything written in our time.
From verbalizing chimpanzees to scientific speculations involving machines with souls, from the mesmerizing, maze-like fiction of Borges to the tantalizing, dreamlike fiction of Lem and Princess Ineffable, her circuits glowing read and gold, The Mind’s I opens the mind to the Black Box of fantasy, to the windfalls of reflection, nofstadter new dimensions uofstadter exciting possibilities.
Mind and consciousness becomes dispensable items in our accounts of reality, ghosts in the bodily machine Yet there are indications here and there that the tide may be tuming Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, seems a welcome sign of change. Paperbackpages.
Published April 1st by Bantam Books first published To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. Does anybody know if hofstzdter has been made an audio book version of The Mind’s I?
Lists with This Book. Dec 15, Manny rated hofstacter really liked it Shelves: I have been conducting a long mebte about the nature of consciousness with Lotz, Robert and Wastrel in the comment thread to this review. I thought I might as well summarize my position and move the conversation to a more sensible place.
To cut to the chase, I am doubtful that the “problem of consciousness” really is such an interesting philosophical problem any more. Obviously, until you have reached a certain point in the development of human knowledge, the existence of the mental sphere – I have been dee a long discussion about the nature of consciousness with Lotz, Robert and Wastrel in the comment thread to this review.
Obviously, until you have reached a certain point in the development of human knowledge, the existence of the mental sphere – thoughts, sensations, intentions, desires, and so on – is something utterly extraordinary that is in great need of an explanation. But I think that’s no longer true.
Although the development of modern neuroscience has helped, I don’t see this as the decisive thing.
Hofstadter, Douglas R. 1945-
Neuroscience still doesn’t understand the brain terribly well. What I do see as decisive is Turing’s work on computability.
Two hundred and fifty years earlier, Newton had launched one of the most important paradigm changes in history: Of course, he wasn’t by any means the first person to think of this, but he was the first person to come up with the right kind of mathematics – partial differential equations – to actually make it work.
And needless to say, he didn’t explain the whole of physics at a stroke. But the things he did manage to explain using his new methods were so remarkable that many insightful people decided that this was the right way to go.
Turing, it seems to me, did something very similar. He suggested that the mental world should also be thought of as mathematical; once again, the reason why he got attention was that he found the appropriate kind of mathematics, this time the theory of computable functions. As with Newton, it would be ridiculous to say that Turing solved the whole problem of the nature of the mind. But he was able to offer a rigorous way of conceptualizing the mental, and people could now start constructing not only mathematical formulas that described mental functions, but also artifacts which reified those formulas as physical processes.
Or, to put it more simply, you could build machines that mehte able to think. It is easy to point to aspects of the mind that we still can’t model mathematically with any great degree of success. We don’t have good mathematical models for concepts like beauty, humor or religious feeling. We have very unsatisfactory models for emotion and language. But Turing’s work is only 80 years old: For example, there was no decent idea of what “heat” might be.
Despite this, many people believed in Newton’s program because of all the things it had explained, which until then had been more or less incomprehensible. As recently as the 80s, philosopher Hubert Dreyfus listed both of these as tasks which no machine would ever, even in principlebe able to perform.
To me, it seems quite reasonable to take Turing’s program seriously and embrace its core hypothesis: Needless to say, this hofstadtwr may turn out to out to be mistaken.
But right now, it’s the one the human race is spending douglzs energy investigating, for the same reason that Newton’s program has beaten all hofwtadter competitors. It lets you do philosophy in a quantitative way and make measurable, incremental progress. So if that’s what we in practice believe, why not admit it?
View all comments. I was given this book as a gift from one of the most interesting persons I’ve ever known. It had been my hangout for years previously as the second floor location fronted the east with ell windows, making the woodsy place sunny and warm. By the early eighties I was pretty well known there. The way one met people was usually b I was given this book as a gift from one of the most interesting persons I’ve ever known.
Presumably that’s how Natalie and I met. In any case, we talked a lot. She was unusually well-read and earnest about much of her studying because she was, she told me, episodically insane. This was all very interesting to talk about. In a few weeks, however, I saw it happen: I probably took her to the hospital at least four times. Years later it was discovered that her problem was water retention associated with her cycle.
When other women would discharge, fluid would build up within her. The increased pressure in the brain would lead to the symptoms. To grow up feeling different and inferior, out-of-control, to think oneself prone to insanity, was character building in Natalie’s case.
She was a pretty girl and could have become devoted to partying and dating. Instead, she had become unusually serious, thoughtful and, to me, fascinating. Some time after giving me this book, she married, had a baby The book, incidentally, was excellent and well-chosen.
View all 5 comments. Jul 30, Joshua Stein rated it it was ok Shelves: It has a lot of interesting ideas, but doesn’t have the time to develop them given the story-reflection format of the text. While the book includes a number of seminal pieces in philosophy of mind, as well as some great pieces of fiction, they dont’ really fit together all that well stylistically or intellectually, and often Dennett and Hofstadter spend a fair amount of time justifying the inclusion o I like both Dennett and Hofstadter, but I can’t say that I particularly enjoyed The Mind’s Eye.
While the book includes a number of seminal pieces in philosophy of mind, as well as some great pieces of fiction, they dont’ really fit together all that well stylistically or intellectually, and often Dennett and Hofstadter spend a fair amount of time justifying the inclusion of the piece in the book. I will say that both do a fair job writing their own reflections, and discussing the ideas in some of the earlier works, which are used alongside writing by Borges and Nozick and Searle, but those are really the only major brightspots in a work that feels sewn together in odd places, presented in a way that is just south of playful [something Dennett and Hofstadter generally do very well].
I think that the major problem for the book is the format. Both of these guys are famous for developing their ideas in a text and being able to really draw out some interesting detail while presenting very difficult material in an engaging way. That is their wheelhouse when it comes to writing, but they obviously don’t manage it here because they don’t have the time to develop their own ideas and the inclusion of a good deal of other work forces them to bounce around to subjects that, while interesting, are not developed enough to be satisfying.
To folks who are interested in reading a few of the sections of the book as they seem them, and interested in Dennett and Hofstadter’s commentary, I totally understand picking the book up, but if you’re looking for an engaging read on philosophy of mind that explores some of the interesting features of phenomenology or artificial intelligence, best look elsewhere.
All of those works develop many of the same ideas that are in the book, but in more depth and with some thought that is easier to track. Jan 29, John Jr. Among the working assumptions with which we get through the day are those that tell us we have a self, that its decisions are or at least can be freely willed rather than determined, that our intelligence as employed in language transcends what a machine can do, and that these qualities and processes are somehow connected with, embodied in, our physical being, mainly our brain.
Philosophers have been questioning these assumptions for some time and proposing answers to the conundrums they provoke Among the working assumptions with which we get through the day are those that tell us we have a self, that its decisions are or at least can be freely willed rather than determined, that our intelligence as employed in language transcends what a machine can do, and that these qualities and processes are somehow connected with, embodied in, our physical being, mainly our brain.
Philosophers have been questioning these assumptions for some time and proposing answers to the conundrums they provoke. The three words which are the first thing often the only thing most of us associate with Descartes, “cogito, ergo sum,” were the result of this; after wondering whether his entire mental experience might be an elaborate hoax created by a demon, he concluded, to oversimplify, that because he was able to think he must exist–there must be something doing the thinking.
He was neither the first nor the last to wonder about such things. Numerous recent pieces of fiction and nonfiction examining these issues are contained in this book.
I’ve learned since reading it that the ideas discussed, and in many cases the actual texts, are seen as groundbreaking, essential works in their field.
[PDF] Douglas Hofstadter & Daniel Dennett – El ojo de la – Free Download PDF
A sampling of its contents: The entire book seems to be available onlinethough in a less-than-ideal format. Taste it there if you want, but if you’re like me you’ll prefer to curl up with a real book; there’s no e-reader form. Explores the nature of personal identity through some good ,ente fashioned concept fracture. Think you know who you are, where you are, how you are? Thanks for uprooting several dualists still lurking about in me, and letting them shrivel in the glare of the one gold sun.
I liked that, while a collection intended to provoke in a variety of ways, the reflections limited the whole. None of this wishywashy isn’t that so INteresting jente rather, this is right and that is wrong, and her Explores the nature ooj personal identity through some good ol fashioned concept fracture.
None of this wishywashy isn’t that so INteresting crap; rather, this is right and that is wrong, and here is why ha eel. Though I was disappointed because – in the first Borges essay, “Borges and I”, I thought that the reflection was still a continuation of the essay, and a third character, Borges reflecting on himself in the style of a literary critic, had emerged!
The functional systemic picture that emerges from the reflections and several selections is lovely – but again, as with all theories born of concept fracture, the whole point of the original concept in question is lost; what would a meaning mean?